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In discussions of the conservation of culturally significant architecture, awareness about 
issues of temporality and its theoretical import has been approached from varied, partial, 
perspectives. These perspectives have usually focused on accounts of temporality that focus 
on the past and the present – and more rarely the future – without considering either the 
complete spectrum of human temporality or its ontological bases. This article addresses this 
shortcoming with a phenomenology of conservation grounded on the fundamental attitudes of 
cultivation and care. After a phenomenological and existentialist analysis of Cesare Brandi’s 
thought – focusing on his paradigmatic Theory of Restoration – his attitude comes forth as a 
limited instance of the modern conservation attitude that is concerned exclusively with 
architecture as art. This attitude results in a limited temporal intentionality. Following 
Ingarden and Ricoeur, the existential approach is here applied to the deduced dimensions of 
the space and time of Dasein – in Heidegger’s terms – outlining the grounding of 
conservation on an existential interpretation of the more fundamental notions of cultivation 
and care. This interpretation suggests a solution for the modern impasse with an existential 
account of both the artistic grounding of architecture and its characterisation as the place that 
temporally accompanies Dasein. Architecture thus emerges as a manifold being, constituting 
existentially the space for the authentic human being, whose temporal consciousness compels 
it to cultivate and care about that space, thus enriching the possible approaches to 
conservation as a collective endeavour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The distinction between consciousness and object allowed Husserl to suggest a 
setting for human beings within which they can be conscious of their constant 
becoming in time. In Husserl’s suggested temporality, humans exist by having a past, 
present, and future.1 For conservators of architecture, however, the centre of gravity of 
temporality has often, and preferentially, been situated in the past, sometimes in the 
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present, but only rarely in the future. Following Husserl, Heidegger, more than any 
other philosopher, started to question not so much the relation between a human 
being’s consciousness and time, but also the existence of human being as temporality 
and thus, in a broader sense, Being as temporality. We will follow Heidegger in 
focusing on the concept of Dasein as the place of disclosure of Being.  For Heidegger, 
Dasein, as a being-in-the-world, overcomes the subject-object paradigm, thus 
emphasising humanity’s embeddedness in the environment. Part of the appeal of these 
frameworks is that Cesare Brandi, with whose work we will engage, primarily 
positioned his later aesthetic theories – in particular his Teoria Generale della Critica 
– in these philosophical terms.2 Accordingly we will attempt to illuminate the relation 
between Dasein’s temporality and architecture by interpreting this relation in the 
context of a critical dialogue between Heidegger’s existential philosophy and Brandi’s 
theoretical framework in his Theory of Restoration, taken as an example of the 
modern approach to conservation.3 Our aim is to articulate a more holistic attitude to 
architectural conservation, thus achieving a consideration of human inhabitation 
within an architectural heritage while placing dwellers as the focus of the restoration. 
We will challenge modern conservation attitudes which privilege a fetishisation of the 
past manifested in architectural objects. 
The place where humanity dwells is formed by nature and architecture. This 
all-embracing environment constitutes the only possible dwelling place and thus the 
only possible horizon for human perception and experience. Gadamer writing 
metaphorically, says, “[...] a hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices 
that we bring with us. They constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present, for 
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they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see.”4 Taken to apply to our 
physical environment, Gadamer’s view means that by the time we reflect in the 
present about our all-embracing environment, we already have preconceived 
perceptions and intuitions about it that cannot but determine our understanding of it. 
The built environment can be read, but how?  As a sort of trace or inscription, as 
Ricoeur has described the city, the architectural place discloses readable structures as 
part of these unavoidable predispositions.5 These structures, however, are neither 
static nor fixed. They evolve along with the historicity of Dasein, but so too does the 
built environment. The environment reacts to each step we take or action we perform. 
The city is the paradigmatic place where this happens. Processes of memory and 
assimilation incessantly take place there and with them humans evolve in time, 
constantly unveiling and concealing their existential condition. Heidegger’s concept of 
disclosedness involves then an uninterrupted decoding of Dasein’s place in the world, 
an understanding that is always merged with that of Dasein’s constant temporalizing.6 
Heidegger had first suggested in Being and Time that temporality is ontologically 
primary; however, in his later writings he was more concerned about the issue of 
dwelling, as the fundamental way of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Because of this 
shift in favour of place instead of time, scholars have suggested the primacy of place 
for Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, considering the German origin of the word that is 
already stating a there (Da) before a when.7 
As we approach an interpretation of the conservation endeavour’s 
intentionality, this philosophical background allows us to begin addressing the 
architectural place in existential terms. This interpretation of existence rests on some 
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of Ingarden’s modes of being as well as on some phenomenological, temporal 
standpoints concerning the architectural place, understood now as Dasein’s sheltering 
environment. A hermeneutical journey through the architectural place and a 
phenomenological approach to the assimilation of its transformation are taken as 
indications of an existential and more fundamental condition for conservation than 
mere fetishisation of architecture. We will take Brandi’s Theory of Restoration, which 
focused on the conservation of the work of art, architecture included, only as a work 
of art, as typical of the modern approach to conservation that is here to be criticized.  
We turn now to an engagement with the significant issue of architecture as inhabited 
art and Brandi’s concept of astanza (pure presence). 
FROM PERCEPTION TO TEMPORAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
In ancient times, or in some primitive cultures, understanding about and 
orientation to the world was considered an inherent human ability. Advances in 
technology brought precision, but at the cost of an abandonment of this intimate 
awareness of being-in-the-world. Absent scientific weather forecasting, farmers knew 
about changes in the weather by observing environmental evidence; without GPS 
technology to guide them, sailors used to observe the sun and other stars to orient 
themselves. Our world has become mediated -- represented -- and our direct 
experience of it has been weakened. Something about our awareness or our relation 
with our environment was lost with the advent of modernity. 
Conservation, as conceived in Brandi’s Theory of Restoration, is consistent 
with this modern shift, considering the architectural place where mankind dwells, not 
as somewhere in which humanity is embedded, but as a separated something. Modern 
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conservation, within the modern paradigm that separates subject and object, is but a 
way of humanity approaching the world while concealing its existential role there, 
thus hindering the revelation of the world as the place where human being is. Current 
controversies about conservation, development and regeneration projects evidence 
attitudes where objectification of buildings and disdain towards local dwellers hinder 
the achievement of agreeable solutions for the main stakeholders.8 In many of these 
controversies, the body-space relationship in the constitution of architecture is both 
merged with and overwhelmed by collective memory. Nevertheless, for the modern 
attitude in conservation, architecture emerges mainly as a static condition: a condition 
that seems limited to convey mainly the sensual parts of the architectural manifold. In 
Ingarden’s ontology, objects can be either temporal or extra-temporal objects. He 
proposes three kinds of temporal beings that we may consider as candidates for how 
we perceive architecture according to the determination of time: architecture as event, 
architecture as process and architecture as an object enduring in time.9 Modern 
conservation perceptions constitutes architecture as an event in time, thus 
downplaying, or even ignoring, the other two. 
Individual Sensual Experiences 
Setting a matrix of the elements constituting the existential determination of 
Dasein, one could have on one side the individual and the collective dimensions of 
being and on the other space and time. Seen in this way, the body and the immediate 
environment around it constitute a primordial personal space.  Expanding outward, 
collective space is constituted by the architectural place, in the form of buildings and 
cities, as the place of Dasein in its collective manifestation. This is where architecture, 
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and the problem of its conservation as temporal intentionality, is located. Time too can 
be considered both individually and collectively.  Any possible personal time is 
constituted by an existential cone of life-time that locates the horizons of experience at 
one’s birth at one extreme and one’s death at the other. Collectively, the historical and 
mythical dimensions of Dasein’s temporal narrative occupy the last position in the 
matrix. Intending architecture from each one of these positions involves the 
emergence of different manifestations of culturally significant architecture (CSA). 
(see figure 1) 
Bodily perception of architecture as event, means dealing with an unchanging 
state, an icon presented as a constant now. This is one of the main ways in which 
architecture has been perceived in the current dominance of the modern gaze. The 
apprehension of architecture, however, is not merely of a constant now in its 
materiality, but also in its temporality. In this sense, an instant is individualised, 
selected and privileged among many other possible instants. The temporal gaze is 
localised in time as eternal, or as a-temporal, and it looks at all time from that arbitrary 
moment, being usually an equally de-localised present. This apprehension of 
architecture departs from the present and is always looking towards the past. When the 
time for conservation comes, what is being preserved is not an environment but an 
object, often a seen object. An image as event corresponds to the optical givenness 
that Brandi considers for architecture as a work of art, which constitutes the realising 
of conservation at the expense of other elements of the architectural manifold. 
Architecture perceived as event can also be correlated with Dasein’s ordinary 
life because it works as the background for that life.10 Dasein in the state of fallenness 
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– to use Heidegger’s term – would not be able to discern the hidden architectural truth 
via the apprehension of our being merged with the place, which remains concealed. 
This relation is latent only at a sensual level due to the dominance of the visual. 
Awareness about the architectural place begins in childhood and develops from the 
body. The seminal assimilation of the architectural place through the senses originates 
its image in consciousness in the form of memories and recollections. Thus, when the 
moment of objectivising architecture comes, its image as event in time appears as one 
of the essential ways to concretize it.  
Pervasiveness of the Image 
This prevalence of the visual is evidenced in the pervasiveness of the image in 
Western culture and conservation is no exception to this. For Brandi’s aesthetics, as 
well as his theory of restoration, the image is privileged as the locus of the 
manifestation of pure presence that he names astanza. Arguably, the image that 
conservation privileges is not always artistic. Despite the privileged character of the 
visual image, other bodily perceptions can be, phenomenologically, the first possible 
experiences of human spatiality. For human beings the earliest perceived space is the 
womb: one’s own body, the space that one occupies and the fluid that surrounds one, 
although without differentiation into self and environment. At this primordial level, 
we are as one with the environment. Later, after birth, the air that we breathe is part of 
us while inside us, detaching from us when exhaled; for this, and similar reasons, the 
limit of our body is not sharply perceived. Awareness of the body being embedded in 
the medium is concealed from the modern gaze and consequently the architectural 
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place does not manifest itself as an environment but as alien material buildings and 
mathematically definable spaces.  
The architectural image is not reducible to the visual, contra Brandi, but to any 
event of sensual perception. The experience of architecture as image emerges from the 
performance of the corporeal body as well as from the dimension of meaning when 
perceiving images as representations. The images of an architectural place across the 
time of one’s life form a reserve within which more complex constitutions of 
architecture are discerned, such as mythical and historical ones. The image of the 
architectural place – understood as its sensual apprehension – cannot be simply 
avoided; instead, it demands to be properly considered in the problem of architectural 
conservation, as part of the architectural manifold and not as the architectural totality. 
Temporal Processes of Meaning Production 
The notion of historical temporality, embraced by conservation in its modern 
form, developed following the Enlightenment . Brandi was very aware of the flaws of 
what he called the historical search for meaning.11 For him art emerges from the 
presence of the work – astanza – and not from its historical factuality, which he terms 
flagranza. In the latter sense, the apprehension of architecture as a process – such as in 
the result of myths and histories – is linked with the search for meaning, i.e., 
significance and explanation. 
The post-Enlightenment invention of historical time, as a new way of 
understanding temporality, prompted the attitude of learning from the past by trying to 
discover the laws of historical development. The problem here emphasised is about 
the relationship between the modern conservator and the audience for culturally 
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significant architecture. If the audience is compelled to deal with architecture as 
history – or as myth – the audience’s relationship to that history or myth needs to be 
authentic. In such a case representations in the form of frozen past time would not 
seem appropriate. Matter cannot guarantee memory; consequently the architectural 
place should always be kept alive, or it risks becoming sterile archaeology. Brandi’s 
theory of restoration, although theoretically informed about the nature of art in 
temporal terms, still seems aimed at privileging some sort of authentic evidence of the 
past, without any concession to the existential dimension of the relation between 
architecture and society. In his Memory History Forgetting, Ricoeur suggests moving 
from an epistemological interpretation of memory and history towards a path of 
critical and hermeneutical ontology. 12 For us, this suggested move requires an 
excursus to face the problem that was the main concern for Brandi, namely the one of 
the nature of art in architecture, and our criticism of his forgetting of being. 
THE UNCONCEALED OBJECT OF ESTRANGED 
CONSERVATION 
A work of art in general seems to have an ontological origin in its materials  
and in a certain attunement in consciousness. Thus, in Heidegger’s terms, art appeals 
to Dasein’s being through art’s being. Art’s being is found, however, not in matter, but 
in consciousness. As Ingarden suggests, art is supported on the matter of the work – 
through which it is revealed – but the artistic quality is immaterial; it is pure presence, 
what Brandi calls astanza.13 Brandi, as a phenomenologically informed art theorist, 
understood the philosophical problems at issue for art in the dialectics of actuality and 
presence;. If this underpinning is mostly implicit in his Theory of Restoration, his later 
thought in Teoria Generale della Critica explicitly articulated issues concerning art 
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arising from phenomenology, structuralism and existentialism, although his theory of 
restoration could have been improved with more extensive existential insights . For 
architecture in particular the inclusion of humanity’s existential dimension would have 
been a significant addition, given architecture’s fundamental characteristic as a 
dwelling place. 
We therefore label Brandi’s attitude toward conservation estranged, given that 
he considers architecture exclusively as pure presence or astanza in the act of 
conservation, rather than as a site of human dwelling. We describe it as estranged 
because, despite arriving at a seemingly appropriate phenomenological deduction of 
the work of art, he does not consider the existential dimension of the architectural 
place that we find as one of its most salient features. Architecture has both a 
dimension as meaning and a dimension as presence. Estranged conservation coincides 
with Brandi’s notion of restoration which takes the work of art as an intemporal and 
meaningless entity. Similarly to how phenomenology seems to accept the intemporal 
quality of the work of art, some contemporary scholars emphasize the preconceptual 
aspect of aesthetic experience; Brandi is a the precursor to this approach.14 In this 
sense, it is our contention that meaning (including language, signification, predicative 
thought, actuality and so forth) and presence – astanza in Brandi’s terms – are but 
different aspects of the manifold condition of the architectural place in which presence 
manifests its intemporal aesthetic dimension. 
Meaningless Architectural Presence  
For Heidegger, art in the modern West seems detached from its authentic origin 
and is thus treated as meaningless. Heidegger and Brandi articulate art’s 
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meaninglessness in different ways. Brandi, in his Teoria Generale della Critica, finds 
the original sense of meaning in reference, namely as a correlative to the linguistic 
sign.15 He detaches language, however, from any ontological relationship with the 
notion of truth, because his understanding of sign comes from the Kantian theory of 
the schema. This detachment of art from meaning is not articulated – as Heidegger 
had done – as the interplay between the concealment and unconcealment of being.   It 
is rather, presented as a false problem; “the horizon to which one cannot ever be close 
enough, because we ourselves are the horizon. The reality, as the possession of the 
real, is a progressive approach that leaves us always as far away as before.”16 Brandi 
describes the notion of art as detached from meaning as a manifestation of pure 
presence or astanza. By contrast, Heidegger links aesthetics back to its sensual 
origins: 
we do not need first to call or arrange for this situation in which we let things encounter us 
without mediation. The situation always prevails. In what the senses of sight, hearing, and 
touch convey, in the sensations of color, sound, roughness, hardness, things move us bodily, 
in the literal meaning of the world. The thing is the aisthēton, that which is perceptible by 
sensations in the senses belonging to sensibility. Hence the concept later becomes a 
commonplace according to which a thing is nothing but the unity of a manifold of what is 
given in the senses. Whether this unity is conceived as sum or as totality or as Gestalt alters 
nothing in the standard character of this thing-concept.17 
Heidegger suggests that after the mistake of identifying the thing with the idea, 
truth also came to be understood as correspondence between, in Brandi’s terms, sign 
and referent. 
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In Heidegger’s renowned discussion of the peasant shoes in a Van Gogh 
painting, he argued that the disclosure of what equipment is in truth was realised 
through the work of art. According to him “[t]he painting spoke. In the nearness of the 
work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be.”18  Thus, the 
work of art brings forth the presence of something that was not there before, that is 
what something is in truth. Heidegger calls this an unconcealedness of Being, what the 
Greeks called alētheia (commonly translated as truth). Heidegger suggests that truth 
happens in the work of art through the disclosing of a particular being. “The essence 
of art would then be this: the truth of being setting itself to work [...]”19 For Heidegger 
architecture would constitute art in the happening of the truth of its inhabitation, in its 
allowance of dwelling, while for Brandi astanza in architecture is manifested in the 
mutual and revealing opposition between exterior and interior,. While Brandi does not 
ignore inhabitation, it is only important as a way to visualise architecture in its 
actuality while detaching it from the phenomena of signification: “[...] a house is not 
built in order to communicate that it is a house, but to inhabit it” he says.20 
Heidegger suggests that in the work of art there is a strife between disclosing 
and concealing in which by “[s]etting up a world and setting forth the earth [...] the 
unconcealedness of being as a whole, or truth, is won.”21 This bringing forth of (a) 
being is done in a way never done before and never to be repeated that finds its 
correlation in the epiphany of the work of art to which Brandi regularly appeals. In the 
case of architecture this effect is multiplied by the plurality of Dasein’s inhabitation. 
By contrast, Heidegger argued that for the Greeks, craft and art were not 
distinguished, both being called technē, a mode of knowing, not making.22 Through 
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technē it was possible to reach alētheia. In contrast with today’s Western notion of art, 
art for the Greeks was part of the common knowledge of the essence of everyday 
beings. 
Brandi argues that the implicit evidence of inhabitation is that it results from a 
need.  He does not, however, relate spatial behaviours – as a portrait of architectural 
inhabitation – with mimesis because he is convinced that architecture portrays 
nothing; architecture, for Brandi, is not a mimetic art. Even if architecture is not 
mimetic, we argue that Technē – in the original Greek sense – would allow ways of 
inhabitation to emerge through legitimate architectural creation and conservation. 
Brandi, because of his commitment to a quasi-Kantian schematism, would reject this 
move. For him “before the primitive hut, there was no concept or image; there was 
only…a vague intention of that need for shelter from the inclement weather, the 
dangers of beasts and other men, and who knows what else.”23 
In the interplay of alētheia’s disclosure and concealedness, Heidegger suggests 
that “art is the preserving of truth in the work. Art then is the becoming and happening 
of truth.”24 Conservation, on this view, would be subsumed in the notion of art and not 
considered something independent. For Brandi restoration was focused on the artistic 
quality of architecture and thus to be distinguished from other possible ways of taking 
care of architecture. For Heidegger Brandi’s view mistakenly takes art as a quality and 
not as a happening. Brandi correctly deduced a specific activity to deal with the 
artistic manifold, however he failed to integrate the existential dimension in his 
account of architecture. For Heidegger by constrast, preservation would be to inhabit – 
to dwell – in the way that architecture asks Dasein to participate in the revealing of 
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truth. We explore this particular dimension of inhabitation in the next section. What is 
noteworthy up to here is that conservation of architecture is conceived as part of 
humanity’s primordial sense of temporality and not an independent intention to take 
care of architecture nor a recognition of architecture as an alien artistic quality as in 
Brandi’s notion of restoration. 
Aesthetics, Truth and Language 
Heidegger suggests that aesthetics as a reflection on art was not required in 
classical Greece because art was instead the way of knowledge itself; it was the way 
in which Dasein related to its world “integrated into a unified and meaningful 
totality.”25 It was only later, in Plato, that beauty came to be understood as the 
manifestation of truth, in the eidos of things. This Platonic conception of truth reduces 
art to the role of imitation of the idea, displacing it from the privileged place of 
alētheia that Heidegger finds essential. With Heidegger’s notion of art as alētheia or 
unconcealment, art itself would be the origin of the work of art and the artist.26 If art is 
unconcealment, then it isn’t mimetic, making clear how architecture can be art.  The 
detachment between architecture and mimesis was a difficult one for Brandi to 
account for. On the one hand, he says that art forms like painting (or sculpture), 
“given its figurative nature, exists in spatial autonomy that is the prerequisite of pure 
reality.” On the other hand, it seemed obvious to him that architecture did not imitate 
anything.27 What could an architectural mimesis imitate?  Instead, the key to his 
approach to architecture as art can be found in his use of the Kantian schematism, 
which determines an epistemological position and not an existential one. 
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It has been suggested that Kant’s demand for universal assent in matters of 
taste requires an appeal to a human community of sense (sensus communis) as a 
possible destiny “perhaps never to be realized.”28 On this interpretation “through 
[Heidegger’s] detailed discussion of the problem of presentation and representation, of 
what he calls schematism and symbolism, Kant has problematized, and to certain 
extent neutralized, the question of imitation.”29 It is on this epistemological loop that 
Brandi is trapped in his demarcation of architecture as art. Brandi discussed this from 
his early Eliante until the later Teoria Generale della Critica.30 Since Brandi’s 
approach to art, especially architecture, was mainly epistemological, his theory of 
restoration is easily interpreted as a suggestion for praxis. On an existential front, 
Heidegger attempted then to overcome the metaphysical concept of aesthetics that 
highlighted the aspects of production and imitation and to bring art back to the 
concept of alētheia. Thus for different reasons, both Brandi and Heidegger removed 
mimesis from the notion of art. 
For Heidegger, language, and especially poetic language, plays a primordial 
role in bringing forth the essence of beings, clearing the concealment of Being itself.31 
We do not wish to dwell on the linguistic essence of the bringing forth of truth, but in 
the non-linguistic manifestation of the unconcealedness of the Being of beings. 
Heidegger writes 
Art, as the setting-into-work of truth, is poetry. Not only the creation of the work is poetic, but 
equally poetic, though in its own way, is the preserving of the work; for a work is in actual 
effect as a work only when we remove ourselves from our commonplace routine and move 
into what is disclosed by the work, so as to bring our own essential nature itself to take a stand 
in the truth of beings. The essence of art is poetry. The essence of poetry, in turn, is the 
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founding of truth. We understand founding here in a triple sense: founding as bestowing, 
founding as grounding, and founding as beginning. Founding, however, is actual only in 
preserving. Thus to each mode of founding there corresponds a mode of preserving...”32 
It is in this preserving that the conservationist attitude finds its origin; it could 
misleadingly look again to a preservation of truth as in the scientific model. But let us 
not be confused; it is not an epistemological approach to truth anymore, but – in 
Heidegger’s terms – it is keeping truth in the clear. Brandi did not consider language 
in the primordial poetic sense that Heidegger did, but instead as both product and tool 
of the “epistemological process.”33 This illustrates a fundamental difference between 
Brandi’s and Heidegger’s notions of truth. Brandi would never have grounded the 
conservation of the architectural work of art on an existential matrix as Heidegger did. 
His way was inspired by the epistemological and neutral Kantian schematism and not 
by an ontological analysis. Brandi’s conservation was a way of recognising the artistic 
process as process developed in time. In terms of temporality, however, Heidegger 
suggested that truth becomes historical through art constituting the origin of creators 
and preservers.34 Modern conservation has been taken since its beginning mainly as an 
objectivising activity and not often as an existential dwelling performance founded on 
care. Brandi’s theory of restoration is no exception, although it is an outstanding 
example of philosophical reflection. Theoretical reflective knowledge is not to be 
marginalised; however, the preference that Heidegger suggested would demand a 
change of attitudes not only concerning architecture as a work of art – as the 
privileged place of manifestation of the truth of being – but arguably as the first, last 
and only place where Dasein dwells. 
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Intemporal Architectural Presence  
The key concepts elaborated by Brandi, in particular his emphasis on art’s 
intemporal condition, can best be made sense of in the context of a philosophical 
investigation of presence. For instance, scholars have called attention to certain 
conditions of extreme temporality, which are paramount in aesthetic experiences.35 
The suddenness and the ephemeral character of these conditions relate directly to 
Brandi’s aesthetic theory in which art is characterised as intemporal. Gadamer, for 
example, suggests that “[a]n entity that exists only by always being something 
different is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to history. It 
has its being only in becoming and return”.36 Given the varied ways in which artistic 
qualities can be perceived, this argument seems controversial. Brandi bases his theory 
of restoration on a double instantiation of the work of art – the historical and the 
aesthetic – that allows consideration of its possible temporal insertion in history.37 The 
historical is implied in the existence of the architectural object in time and eventually 
in its constant use; the aesthetic is given in the recognition of the work of art as such, 
appearing only in exceptional moments. The first instance, however, seems to be the 
one in which temporality is common-sensically manifested. 
The relation between Brandi and the Modern Movement in architectural 
conservation was difficult, especially in historically important places, not so much in 
terms of temporality – or historicity – but in terms of spatiality. By contrast, Gadamer 
has suggested an aesthetic negotiation between new, modern buildings and their 
historical context. Against historicism, he writes that “[e]ven if historically-minded 
ages try to reconstruct the architecture of an earlier age, they cannot turn back the 
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wheel of history, but must mediate in a new and better way between the past and the 
present. Even the restorer or the preserver of ancient monuments remains an artist of 
his time.”38 
Here the difference between Gadamer and Brandi is decisive. Whilst for the 
former even the conservator, and certainly the restorer, is still an artist of his or her 
time, for the latter the restorer of works of art is not an artist but a critic. Restoration 
for Brandi is but a methodological recognition of the work of art as a fact already 
given, not as something to work with.39 Gadamer instead believes that preservation 
implies artistic activity because for him architecture has the mission to mediate 
spatially between drawing attention to itself and redirecting it to the world that 
architecture accompanies.40 Architecture, for Gadamer, is not important as an 
attractive artistic object, but as the sanctuary of mankind’s existence. Thus, the 
approach to the architectural work of art is different from that to other forms of art. 
For Gadamer architecture is correlated with Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, whilst for 
Brandi it represents an exceptional artistic epiphany. 
Architecture may have an undeniable dimension as artistic object; however, 
Brandi’s view of the art of architecture seems detached from fundamental existential 
considerations. Heidegger’s existential approach deduced the condition of art as a 
happening in the work, as an act of revelation: alētheia. Heidegger and Brandi agree 
on the intemporal conditions of architecture as a work of art; however, the attitudes of 
conservation deduced from their positions are opposed. While Brandi’s notion of 
restoration isolates the artistic qualities of architecture, thus ignoring architecture as a 
place to dwell, Heidegger’s concept of preservation seems comprehensive of both the 
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disclosure of the truth of being and the care for Dasein’s place to dwell. This 
existential approach to conservation nowadays should be a significant contribution 
that can help to overcome the impasse whose crisis is starting to be evident in a shift 
towards more participatory paths. Overcoming this crisis would recover dwelling as 
the mission of the architectural place. 
CONSERVATION OF PLACE ACCOMPANYING DASEIN 
We suggest the emergence of cultivation and care as the base of a common 
collective understanding in order to conserve not only culturally significant 
architecture but also architectural places in general. Architecture may constitute not 
only an artistic object or one that is simply present or merely useful; architecture 
participates in an inseparable way in Dasein’s existence. A problem arises with the 
sudden transformation of the world that supported the emergence of certain styles or 
works of architecture. Sometimes Dasein is compelled to exist in a world that is not 
there anymore.41 
We have seen that architecture is not only given to us in sensual presentation, 
but also as constituent of an environment in which we corporeally are. This corporeal 
aspect of architecture points to Dasein’s dwelling as a key component of architecture. 
The in of being-in-the-world starts with the body. For Dasein, the body is the first and 
the only personal occupied space. After that first being there that the body 
characterises, Heidegger would suggest that the spatiality of Dasein “[...] is the point 
at which we need to return to the aroundness (das Umhafte) of the environment 
(Umwelt) of Dasein as being-in-the-world.”42 Heidegger’s notions of concern and care 
relate to this region that we call cultivated and cared for. We now seek to elaborate an 
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account of care pertinent to our times. In doing so, we must account for how 
conservation may shift from a fallen emphasis on objects of the past towards a futural 
sense of the existence of being-among-others. 
In-the-World  
According to this interpretation of Heidegger, considering the aroundness (das 
Umhafte) of its environment (Umwelt) and the in-ness of its being-in-the-world, both 
understood as dwelling, is necessary to understand the spatiality of Dasein. It has been 
suggested that the in-ness can be understood in two senses, one of inclusion and one 
of dwelling, one of being and one of understanding.43 Brandi recognises the possibility 
of conservation beyond the purity of the work of art in the context of the historical 
instance of restoration. Heidegger, by constrast, privileges dwelling, taking care as a 
pre-theoretical attitude, a form of concern that never abandons Dasein. 
The world is given to humanity not as a Cartesian system of spatial coordinates 
but as environments made out of the things objectively present that help Dasein to 
orient itself in the world by configuring a particular spatiality. Heidegger has 
suggested that the way in which Dasein sees the world is obtained from within the 
world, making spatiality pre-objective, existential-ontological and not physical-
mathematical.44 Brandi’s view of conservation is directed to attaining a critical 
recognition and thus a cognitive apprehension of the work of art. For Brandi, 
architecture, as work of art, presents the challenge of being intertwined with an 
existential dimension that he sets aside, at least for the aims of conservation. He did 
not see architecture as the whole that constituted a human environment to be 
conserved integrally with its artistic nature. Rather, he took architecture’s two aspects, 
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the artistic and the historical, and treated them as in need of separate forms of 
conservation. What we are suggesting is that the inclusion of an existential, in this 
case Heideggerean, perspective could add an additional value for the particularities 
that architecture presents as the place of human dwelling.  
Architecture as a work of art cannot be only considered as something present-
at-hand (as a mere thing) or ready-to-hand (as equipment); however, it can be taken as 
both when its artistic nature is concealed. For instance in terms of architecture’s utility 
for inhabitation it is revealed as something ready-to-hand. Nevertheless, as soon as we 
perceive architecture, we perceive the others of the world.45 As a non-figurative art 
form, architecture brings inhabitation as its revealing happening to presence.  
Inhabitation, however, is about Dasein and not about other objects. For architecture, 
Brandi asks for the restoration of its double spatiality; Heidegger instead claims its 
capacity to allow dwelling. This Heideggerean claim establishes a difference between 
architecture as equipment and as a work of art. Brandi seems trapped in-between the 
factual historical instance and the artistic pure presence. In the voice of Delano – the 
American organicist architect character of his Eliante – Brandi says that 
The house is primarily shelter, a place to live and to rest, and therefore it is an internal space, 
a room of air and light, but also of welcoming shade and siesta. One must shape it on the base 
of a person’s life, and not only on certain functions, isolated and geometrically met.46 
These characteristics, however, are absent from the artistic conservation his 
notion of restoration implies, leaving Brandi’s understanding of conservation of 
architecture as art as estranged from Dasein’s being-in-the-world. 
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In his famous essay “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger emphasised the 
roots of cultivation and care for the terms building and dwelling. He discloses 
relations of the words with notions of cherishing, protecting, preserving, and caring as 
well as with modes of building such as cultivating or edifying.47 One can suggest, with 
Heidegger, the conservation of architecture as the privileged place for Dasein to dwell 
and consider the clearing of the space for it to be free and safe. We suggest that this 
ideal is constituted by the architectural place, which includes culturally significant 
architecture as a substantial part, but in no case the only part, and not always the most 
important part for the inhabitation of humanity. Whether it is still needed to dwell, in 
Heidegger terms, or another existential interpretation is an open question. 
Being Temporalizing Beings 
We have suggested cultivation and care as a field for Dasein’s life that merges 
familiar perceptions, public opinion and individual participation. This field was filled 
in pre-modern times by the traditional world and its slow evolution. Modernity and 
post-modernity broke that balance leaving the field to be filled with what Heidegger 
called the fallenness of the world. Fallenness is characterised as one of the 
constituents of care in Heidegger’s thought, the one that puts its emphasis in the 
present. Cultivation and care, as they used to happen in pre-modern times, to create 
and preserve the architectural place were interrupted; they are now a dominant 
concern. 
At this point we must clarify our use of the terms cultivation and care. 
Although they are motivated from an existential approach, we associate cultivation 
with Gadamer’s concept of Bildung [culture, development, formation], which he 
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relates with Kultur. Bildung as formation “describes more the result of the process of 
becoming than the process itself. [...] [It] grows out of an inner process of formation 
and cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a state of continual Bildung.”48 
Further: “what constitutes the essence of Bildung is clearly not alienation as such, but 
the return to oneself – which presupposes alienation, to be sure.”49 For Gadamer, “the 
general characteristic of Bildung [is] keeping oneself open to what is other – to other, 
more universal points of view... To distance oneself from oneself and from one’s 
private purposes means to look at these in the way that others see them.”50 
Cultivation, as related to Bildung, means looking after the environment from 
the most comprehensive horizon for the benefit of the others that exist with oneself. 
Cultivation implies a letting ourselves grow in the opening towards the others. 
The notion of care, however, relates partially to Heidegger’s sense of care in its 
fundamental connection with temporality. Heidegger first conceived care [Sorge] as 
“the care-taker of beyng, such a care-taking involving an irreducible operation of 
creation.”51 He understands the primordial truth of existence as anticipatory, resolute 
disclosedness [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]. Care supposedly reveals existence on 
the basis of itself, which for Heidegger means that Dasein’s existence is always and 
essentially being towards its own death, i.e., Dasein’s existence has death as its most 
extreme horizon. 52 According to Heidegger, in resolute disclosedness Dasein does not 
avoid its finite existence but anticipates it, changing its attitude in relation to its 
surrounding world. This phenomenon points to his notion of care.53 
Dictated by death as the ultimate horizon of existence, temporality is revealed 
in these three dimensions of care: the facticity of being-already-in-a-world (past); the 
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existentiality of being-ahead-of-itself (future); and the falling of being-alongside 
(present). “Temporality reveals itself to be the sense of authentic care.”54 Heidegger’s 
revelation of the original sense of the being of Dasein redefines it as futural, as always 
to come, always becoming.55 From this perspective the notion of conservation requires 
redirection in its temporal emphasis. To conceive his theory of restoration Brandi 
began from the (claimed to be) impossible human intervention in the time of the 
creation of art. He disregarded the internal temporality that the work of art has, as 
evidenced by its previous inhabitation, which we suggest could constitute an 
architectural form of mimesis. The reason for these exclusions was Brandi’s different 
understanding of temporality in which presence (as parousia) is equal with being 
present, being there. Brandi could grasp that art was “parousia without ousia,” thus, 
presence without existence; however, for him the centre of temporality was still 
located in the present.56 
Because of its humanised condition the architectural place – in the form of 
individual buildings, building complexes, or even cities – participates in the 
characteristics of a work of art, but also in features that transform it into an almost 
animated character. The authentic being a place to dwell of architecture connects it 
intimately with humanity’s existence. Architecture seems to mirror the human being’s 
temporalizing of itself in its different dimensions of care. Indeed, architecture 
emulates a being that temporalizes other beings. Architecture shelters cultivation and 
provides care to Dasein, not only in Heidegger’s sense, but also in other possible 
senses, in a way that other forms of art cannot; architecture performs as mother’s 
womb, as lovers’ bed, as final tomb. It accompanies Dasein’s complete existence, 
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offering, when authentic dwelling is given, a cleared opening  in which freedom to 
live and security to die seem, at least philosophically, possible. The ethical 
responsibility for this mission does not fall only on architects and conservators. The 
changes that human inhabitation demands through history invite Dasein to learn how 
to dwell. Dasein, however, needs to develop fertile existential attitudes that help it to 
overcome the modern impasse of conservation. Dasein’s uncanny fate seems to be – in 
the collective and the individual – the search for authentic city, the perennial search 
for home. 
ARCHITECTURAL HABITUATION TO CONSTANT 
BECOMING 
This article aims to move the philosophical discussion on conservation forward 
towards a broader understanding in terms of human existence rather than one based 
only on the preservation of architectural objects. From a theoretical perspective, it is 
hoped that this article will stimulate further developments with similar approaches to 
conservation, thus helping to overcome the impasse in which preservation seems to be 
trapped. On the practical side, taking the existential dimension seriously, especially in 
the context of culturally significant architecture, presents additional challenges that go 
beyond the merely technical problems of conservation, compelling stakeholders, 
institutions and conservators to negotiate and consider these issues in future proposals. 
For architecture and its conservators, we suggest a philosophical compromise, 
rather than the merely practical accomplishment of inhabitation and the attainment of 
transcendental dwelling. In the contemporary world, since people dwell in a plurality 
of forms according to particular existential conditions, there arises the need to 
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establish perpetual open dialogues among individuals and groups. As already 
mentioned, the constant becoming of Dasein requires an always-changing position in 
order to stimulate human empathy. Dasein’s own conservation and care of its place to 
dwell should not ignore that being-among-others that its existence implies. Cultivation 
and care emerge as fundamental attitudes behind conservation both in its relation to 
human being and its architectural place as the paradigmatic place to dwell, as well as 
in the form of the house in its intimate manifestation and in the form of the city in its 
collective one. The approach to conservation from an existential point of view, 
revealed the need to consider the architectural place as a part of the world-
environment and not as a separate object. Architecture implies a place to live within. 
The condition of plurality of the world demands that we maintain an openness to 
integrate a diversity of horizons rather than a closure that fossilises, freezes and 
hinders communication between human beings. The call is for cities and homes to be 
open and not to be closed. Many others have had this uncanny dream before. 
Epilogue 
Temporal and intemporal traces of the intimate and unavoidable connection 
between the worked stone – of a humble tomb or a sumptuous palace – and the flesh 
and mind of human being are manifested to consciousness as the uncanny 
personalised emanation that accompanies us constantly in the form of architecture.  
Stone is a forehead where dreams moan, / devoid of curved water, frozen cypress. / Stone is a 
shoulder to carry time / with trees of tears and ribbons and planets.57 
This poem by García Lorca seems to suggest those absences with which 
architecture is sometimes even more present to us than in its material factuality; it 
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does not make a difference whether it is to be born, to live, or to die, such as the 
unfortunate bullfighter to whom the poem is dedicated. Being there, if authentic 
Dasein, always will compel us to grow and to care about our place. 
Figures 
Figure 1. Matrix of elements of existential determination of Dasein. (Own 
diagram) 
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